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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 18-3125 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VISHALLIE VERASAWMI, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 3:17-cr-00254-002) 
Chief District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 22, 2019 
_____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed November 27, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Vishallie Verasawmi was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to 
commit mail fraud and three counts of mail fraud.  The District Court sentenced her to 
forty-eight months of imprisonment.  Verasawmi now appeals her judgment of conviction 
and sentence.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write solely for the parties’ benefit, so our summary of the facts is brief.  In 
the summer of 2016, Verasawmi worked with her brother to steal over one million dollars 
from Verasawmi’s employer, Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital (“RWJ”).  
Verasawmi’s brother set up fake vendors, and Verasawmi directed that these fake 
vendors be added to RWJ’s accounts payable system.  The two then submitted fraudulent 
invoices so that RWJ would pay the fake vendors that they controlled. 
Subsequently, Verasawmi and her brother were charged with one count of 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and three counts of mail fraud.  At trial, a jury found 
Verasawmi and her brother guilty on all counts. 
The District Court sentenced Verasawmi to forty-eight months in prison, to be 
followed by three years of supervised release.  The District Court also ordered that 
Verasawmi pay $1,066,829.57 in restitution.  This timely appeal followed.1 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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II. 
In this appeal, Verasawmi contests both her conviction and her sentence.  We will 
address each in turn.  
A. 
Verasawmi’s challenge to her conviction concerns a curative instruction that the 
District Court gave after Verasawmi objected to a statement made by the Government 
during its summation at trial.  In its summation, the Government highlighted a piece of 
evidence for the jury:  a note that Verasawmi wrote on June 14, 2016 to a clerk in RWJ’s 
accounts payable department regarding a fake vendor.  See Appendix (“App.”) 703.  
During a sidebar after the Government’s summation, Verasawmi objected to the 
Government’s reference to this note.  She contended that the Government identified the 
note as evidence of her intent to defraud, but immediately after referred to the definition 
of a materially false statement, a different element of mail fraud.  In Verasawmi’s view, 
the Government’s statement was improper because it suggested to the jury that the 
distinct elements of intent and materiality could be collapsed into one.  Verasawmi thus 
requested a “curative instruction.”  App. 712. 
The District Court, without deciding whether the Government’s reference to 
Verasawmi’s note was improper, agreed to give a curative instruction.  The District Court 
proposed reminding the jurors that the court’s instructions on the law controlled.  Neither 
party objected to the District Court’s suggested curative instruction.  The District Court 
also proposed giving the instruction right away and again after closing arguments ended.  
The defendant did not object.  But the Government made an unopposed objection to an 
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immediate curative instruction.  The District Court therefore decided to give the curative 
instruction only once, after closing arguments.  Following closing arguments, the District 
Court instructed: 
[C]losing arguments are designed to present to you the parties’ theories about 
what the evidence has shown and what conclusions may be drawn from the 
evidence. What is said in the closing arguments is not evidence.  
Furthermore, obviously, they have drawn to your attention perhaps certain 
evidence or certain views and also may reference the law.  I will remind you 
it is my instructions on the law that control your deliberations. 
 
App. 771–72.   
 
Now, on appeal, Verasawmi argues that she is entitled to a new trial 
because the District Court’s curative instruction was insufficient.  She asserts that 
the content of the curative instruction was vague and confusing because it was not 
specifically tailored to address her objection, and that the instruction was given too 
late.  We disagree. 
 Since Verasawmi did not object to the content or timing of the District Court’s 
curative instruction at trial, we review for plain error.  See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d 1252, 1260 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also United States v. Brennan, 326 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  “To establish plain error, the defendant must prove that 
there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.”  United States 
v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quotation marks 
omitted).  “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its 
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the 
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quotation marks omitted). 
 The District Court’s curative instruction was not plainly erroneous.  Shortly after 
closing arguments ended, the District Court clearly explained that the jury should follow 
the court’s instructions on the law, notwithstanding any statements made by the parties 
about the law.  Contrary to Verasawmi’s assertions otherwise, the District Court’s 
curative instruction was not vague, confusing, or untimely.  And even assuming arguendo 
that the Government’s reference to Verasawmi’s note was improper, the curative 
instruction adequately addressed Verasawmi’s objection.  See id. at 326 (“We generally 
presume that juries follow instructions given by the District Court, and the time lapse 
between the testimony and the curative instruction here was not long enough to overcome 
that presumption.”).  As the District Court did not plainly err, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction. 
B. 
Next, we consider Verasawmi’s challenge to her sentence.  Verasawmi argues that 
the District Court erred at sentencing for two reasons.  First, she claims that the District 
Court sentenced her to forty-eight months in prison to promote her rehabilitation, in 
violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).  Second, she contends that her 
prison sentence is substantively unreasonable.  Both arguments are without merit. 
1. 
We start with Verasawmi’s Tapia argument.  Verasawmi asserts that the District 
Court ran afoul of Tapia by imposing a term of imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes.  
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In Tapia, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) prohibits a district court from 
“impos[ing] or lengthen[ing] a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a 
treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”  564 U.S. at 335.  Verasawmi 
thus argues that the District Court impermissibly imposed a term of imprisonment for 
rehabilitative purposes by acknowledging her mental health troubles and expressing 
concern about her decision-making skills.  
Verasawmi did not raise this argument at sentencing, so we review for plain error.  
United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 686–87 (3d Cir. 2018).  We have explained 
that a Tapia violation occurs when rehabilitation was “the determining factor in a prison 
sentence.”  Id. at 691.  “Under this standard, rehabilitation may be a factor granted some 
weight in selecting a prison sentence, so long as it is not the primary or dominant 
consideration.”  Id.  
Here, the District Court did not impose Verasawmi’s sentence primarily based on 
rehabilitation.  To the contrary, the District Court emphasized the seriousness of 
Verasawmi’s conduct, her personal history and characteristics, and the need to provide 
just punishment for the offense.  Therefore, as to the alleged Tapia violation, Verasawmi 
has failed to establish that the District Court plainly erred. 
2.  
We now turn to Verasawmi’s argument that her forty-eight-month term of 
imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.  This argument also fails. 
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Napolitan, 830 F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2016).  In evaluating substantive 
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reasonableness, we consider “whether the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a forty-eight-month 
term of imprisonment.  The prison term, nine months below the bottom of Verasawmi’s 
advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, “was premised upon appropriate 
and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.”  United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 
233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).  For example, the District Court 
highlighted, inter alia, the seriousness of Verasawmi’s role in defrauding her employer 
out of over one million dollars, Verasawmi’s personal history and characteristics, and the 
need for deterrence.  We therefore cannot conclude that “no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on [this] particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Verasawmi’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence.  
